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By ALLISON J. STONE*
CALIFORNIA MADE HISTORIC PROGRESS in advancing the
rights of gay and lesbian couples on January 1, 2005 when the Califor-
nia Legislature enacted California Family Code section 297.5, the Do-
mestic Partnership Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003 ("the
Act").' Arguably, the biggest strides made by the Act were in the area
of parenting between same-sex domestic partners.2 Before the Act,
when two women in a registered domestic partnership brought a child
into the world using artificial insemination, only the birth mother was
the legal parent unless the non-birth mother took affirmative steps to
adopt the child.3 After January 1, 2005, however, domestic partners
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criticisms. I am grateful to the editors and staff of the U.S.F Law Review for their support
and excellent editing, in particular Nicole Magaline and Caryn Nutt. This Comment is
dedicated to the beautiful spirit of Laura Trent and everyone else who has suffered from
the effects of homophobia.
1. CAL. Fm. CODE § 297.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). This law was enacted by As-
sembly Bill 205 ("A.B. 205") on January 1, 2005. Assemb. B. 205, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2003).
2. Use of the term "domestic partners" will be used interchangeably with "registered
domestic partners" assuming that, for the purposes of this Comment, domestic partners
are legally registered in the State of California and therefore entitled to the protections of
section 297.5.
3. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 571 (Cal. 2003) (establishing the
second-parent" adoption procedure whereby a person can adopt his or her same-sex part-
ner's child without terminating the parental rights of the biological parent). However, this
procedure does not allow parents to adopt their children before they are born. The form
that a person must fill out to adopt a child asks for the child's name, date of birth, and
location of birth-thus indicating that a child must be born in order to be adopted. Adopt-
200, Adoption Request (revised Jan. 1, 2007), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
forms/fillable/adopt200.pdf. Therefore, non-biological parents do not have substantive
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obtained the same legal rights and obligations as legally-married
spouses. 4 Specifically in the area of parenting, "[t]he rights and obli-
gations of registered domestic partners with respect to a child of ei-
ther of them shall be the same as those of spouses."' 5 This language
creates parental rights in both domestic partners who conceive a child
through artificial insemination because heterosexual married couples
have parental rights when a child is born during their marriage-even
if one parent is not biologically related to the child. 6
I. Background
A. Why the Act Creates Three Legal Parents in Certain Cases
This Comment addresses a potential conflict created by the Act:
when lesbian domestic partners conceive using sperm from a male
acquaintance ("known donor") without physician assistance, the law,
by default, creates parental rights in the known donor and both do-
mestic partners. This situation occurs because the Act fails to address
the "sperm donor statute," which does not allow for the termination
of the donor's parental rights unless the couple inseminates using
sperm from an anonymous donor or from a known donor with the
help of a physician.7 Therefore, because the Act creates substantive
parental rights in both domestic partners and does not address the
rights of the sperm donor in some situations, three parties potentially
have full parental rights to a child conceived by artificial insemina-
tion-the biological mother, her domestic partner, and the known
rights to their children until they are born and the adoption proceedings are final. While
this is a valuable tool in creating parenting rights for same-sex couples, it puts the burden
on the non-biological domestic partner to affirmatively establish parentage. This Comment
addresses why, with the provisions of the Act, parental fights are established in lesbian
domestic partners before the child is born the same way parental rights are created in a
married couple before a child is born into their marriage.
4. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a).
5. Id § 297.5(d).
6. The Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA") states that when a woman gives birth to a
child while she is married, her husband is the presumed father of the child. CAL. FAM.
CODE §§ 7540, 7612 (West 2004). The California courts have a self-help site to answer par-
entage questions. Information contained on the site states, "[a]fterJanuary 1, 2005, if par-
ents are registered domestic partners when a child is born, the law assumes that the
domestic partners are parents." California Courts Self-Help Center, http://www.courtinfo.
ca.gov/selfhelp/family/parentage/intro.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
7. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2004). See alsoJhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr.
530, 537-38 (Ct. App. 1986); Rainbow Flag Health Services, http://www.gayspermbank.
com (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) (explaining that the sperm bank operates under California
Family Code section 7613(b) which "legally separates Donor and Mother," implying that
the donor has no legal parental rights when donating to a sperm bank).
[Vol. 41
Winter 2007] PARENTAL RIGHTS OF REGISTERED DOMESTIC PARTNERS 507
donor.8 The California Supreme Court, however, has never allowed
three parties to have full parental rights to one child.9 Therefore,
when the court is confronted with three people claiming full parental
rights-the two domestic partners and the known donor-the Califor-
nia Supreme Court must protect same-sex families in the same way it
protects heterosexual families. The court must terminate the parental
rights of the known donor in favor of the domestic partners.' 0
This parental conflict between the registered domestic partners
and the known donor exists because the Act creates substantive paren-
tal rights in both registered domestic partners who bring a child into
the world together using assisted reproductive technology while also
retaining the rights of the known donor.11 The Act attempts to rem-
edy legal and societal inequities between homosexual and heterosex-
ual families. 12 In doing so, the Act provides the same level of
protection to the non-biological mother of a child born into a domes-
tic partnership as provided to the husband of a heterosexual married
8. CAL. FAm. CODE § 297.5; CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.
9. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that when a wife's
egg fertilized by the husband's sperm is implanted into a surrogate, all three parties had a
biological connection to the child, but only two parties could be the legal parents).
10. This Comment only addresses the situation of lesbian domestic partners conceiv-
ing using the sperm of a known donor without physician assistance. Although there is no
question that the Act creates substantive parental rights in all registered domestic partners,
not just lesbians, this particular problem is unique to lesbians. Note also that heterosexual
couples cannot be registered domestic partners until they are over the age of sixty-two.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004). Gay male domestic partners cannot biologically con-
ceive a child using artificial insemination although they can inseminate a third party surro-
gate. The protections afforded male same-sex domestic partners under the Act is a critical
issue, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
11. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7540, 7612.
12. Some of these legal and social inequities that existed before the Act, and still exist
under federal law, are evident in the fact that same-sex couples cannot marry and, there-
fore, cannot file joint tax returns, are not eligible for certain property tax credits, and are
denied parental rights to their partner's children. Human Rights Campaign, Federal Bene-
fits of Marriage, http://hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=partners&CONTENTID=14362&
TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2006). See
Freedom to Marry: FAQ, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/node.asp?id=3627 (last visited
Nov. 20, 2006) for an explanation about why gay and lesbian couples need the right to
marry. Under federal law, gay and lesbian people can be lawfully fired from their jobs on
the basis of sexual orientation while it is illegal to fire an employee on the basis of race,
color, gender, national origin, or religion. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17 (2000). See Christopher Lee, Official Says Law Doesn't
Cover Gays, WASH. POST, May 25, 2005, at A25. Another inequity between homosexual and
heterosexual couples is the fact that gay and lesbian people are often the victims of hate
crimes. Christopher Heredia, Hate Crimes Against Gays on Rise Across U.S., S.F. CHRON., Apr.
13, 2001, at A25.
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couple. 13 Many states, including California, have the UPA, which cre-
ates the presumption that a husband is the legal father of his wife's
child if that child is born into their marriage-regardless of whether
he is the child's biological father. 14 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed that presumption of fatherhood as constitutional in Michael
H. v. Gerald D. 5 In Michael H., the Court upheld a California statute
that granted paternity to a woman's husband over her lover, notwith-
standing the results of a blood test proving that the lover was the
child's biological father.' 6 The Act articulates the presumption that
when two people in a domestic partnership have a child together,
each partner is the presumed legal parent of that child. 17 The conflict
arises, however, because the Acts fails to terminate the parental rights
of known donors when they donate sperm to lesbians in a registered
domestic partnership who do not use the assistance of a physician to
inseminate.
The remainder of Part I explains when known donors obtain pa-
rental rights and why. This section also discusses why lesbian couples
may choose to use a known donor without the assistance of physicians
and how the Act fails to address the parental rights of lesbian couples
in this situation.
In Part II, this Comment demonstrates that California has a clear
preference for children to be raised in a two-parent family where both
parents are in a legally cognizable relationship. This preference for
the two-parent family model exists both in the context of heterosexual
and homosexual relationships. This section reviews cases where the
courts had the opportunity to find parenthood in three-parent situa-
tions but expressly declined to do so. The clear preference for a two-
parent family model supports the grant of parental rights to the do-
mestic partner over the known donor because the domestic partners
are in a legally recognized relationship. By granting rights to the
13. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5.
14. CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 7540, 7612. The United States Department of Health and
Human Services, Administration for Children & Families stated in a letter dated August 25,
2000 that nineteen states have adopted the UPA in full. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Administration for Children & Families, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/pro-
grams/cse/pol/DCL/2000/dcl-00-93.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2006). These states include
Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
vada, NewJersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Ohio, Texas, Washington, and
Wyoming. Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.comell.edu/
uniform/vol9.html#paren (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
15. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
16. Id. at 113.
17. CAL. FAi. CODE § 297.5.
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known donor over the domestic partner, the court would fracture the
stability of the lesbian two-parent family.
Part III of this Comment lays out a detailed explanation of the
presumptions of parentage by reviewing cases that have found father-
hood (and motherhood) to exist based on the UPA presumptions
even when it occasionally meant finding against the biological parent.
Thus, in lesbian domestic partnerships, the court can, and must, find
against the biological parent (the known donor) in favor of the non-
biological mother.
Part IV argues that the presumptions of parentage must apply
with equal force to domestic partners as to heterosexual spouses. This
uniform application is logical considering the fact that the domestic
partners are raising their children in legally cognizable two-parent
families-the kind of family the State of California reveres. Further-
more, the known donor cannot assert paternity over the non-biologi-
cal mother because he is not one of the three parties granted standing
under the UPA to challenge paternity-the mother, the spouse living
with the biological mother (the non-biological mother, i.e., the pre-
sumed parent), or the child.
Part IV also demonstrates that irrefutable evidence of biological
ties does not foreclose parental presumptions. Accordingly, the know-
ledge that one domestic partner is not biologically related to the child
does not prevent the parental presumptions from applying to that
mother. Finally, the California Supreme Court has already applied the
presumptions of parentage to women in same-sex domestic partner-
ships 18 and, based on the rationale laid out in this Comment, will nec-
essarily do so again as equity and justice dictate.
B. Legal Rights of Sperm Donors
California statutory law helps same-sex couples become parents
by automatically terminating the parental rights of a sperm donor
when he donates sperm to a clinic or physician for insemination of a
woman who is not his wife. 19 The reasoning behind this law is that
men will more likely donate sperm when they are free from the fear of
18. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d
(Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005) (discussed infra note 60 and
Section IV(C) (3)).
19. CAL. FAm. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2004). If a man donates sperm for the purpose
of inseminating his wife, as in the case of in-vitro fertilization (where the wife's egg is
fertilized by the husband's sperm and the resulting zygote is implanted into the wife's
uterus), the parental rights of the sperm-donating husband are not terminated. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
being called upon to parent the child or pay child support.20 Also,
women will more likely use donated sperm when they feel assured that
the donor will not try to take custody of the resulting child. 21
The sperm donor's parental rights (and obligations) are not au-
tomatically terminated, however, when a lesbian couple uses the
sperm of a known donor without the assistance of a physician. 22 Os-
tensibly, the laws attempt to prevent a situation where an unmarried
woman has sex with a man, gets pregnant, and refuses to acknowledge
the parental rights of the father. Another possible rationale for these
laws is that the legislature wants to prevent a situation where a man
can avoid the responsibilities of fatherhood. It appears that the law
will only terminate the parental rights of the biological father when
there is some clear indication that he did not intend to be the father
of the child prior to impregnation. 23 Such intent is most obvious when
a man anonymously donates sperm to a sperm bank; in other words,
the mother and child will never know the identity of the donor, and it
is clear that the sperm donor did not intend to be involved in the
child's life. The law also appears to infer the intent to avoid father-
hood when a man donates sperm to a physician for insemination of a
woman who is not his wife. 24 However, if a lesbian couple uses the
sperm of a known donor and inseminates without the help of a physi-
cian, there is no statutory or common law terminating the parental
rights of the known donor. Regardless, many lesbian couples still
make the informed choice to inseminate using a known donor with-
out the use of a physician. 25
20. SeeJhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534-35 (Ct. App. 1986), for a discus-
sion of the rationale behind California Family Code section 7005, which was amended in
1993 to become section 7613. CAL. FAm. CODE § 7613. In Jhordan C., the court discussed
how the presence of a professional third party, such as a physician, serves to formalize the
donor/donee relationship and thus can help prevent confusion or disagreement about the
role of the parties in the child's life. Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
21. Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 534 ("[T]he California Legislature has afforded un-
married as well as married women a statutory vehicle for obtaining semen for artificial
insemination without fear that the donor may claim paternity, and has likewise provided
men with a statutory vehicle for donating semen to married and unmarried women alike
without fear of liability for child support.").
22. CAL. Fam. CODE § 7613(b).
23. Therefore, a man who testifies that he had no intention of getting a woman preg-
nant cannot escape parental responsibilities if he did, in fact, impregnate a woman.
24. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b).
25. In a Dutch study of 105 couples, forty one of whom were lesbian, ninety-eight
percent of lesbian couples chose to use a known donor over an anonymous donor. Parents'
Attitudes to Sperm Donation--Still Some Concerns About Being Open, MED. NEWS TODAY, Jan. 26,
2005, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=19254. See also eHow:
How to Find a Sperm Donor as a Lesbian Couple, http://www.ehow.com/how_17537_
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C. Why Lesbian Couples Use Known Donors Without the
Assistance of Physicians
There are several ways a lesbian couple may choose to insemi-
nate: a couple may obtain sperm from an anonymous donor at a
sperm bank and take it to a physician for assistance in insemination;
the couple may also obtain the sperm from the sperm bank and in-
seminate in the privacy of their own home; 26 or a couple may take
sperm from a known donor and bring it to a physician for insemina-
tion. The sperm donor does not have parental rights over the result-
ing child in any of the described situations. 27 Furthermore, if the
couple is heterosexual and the couple brings the sperm of the hus-
band to a physician for insemination, the husband's parental rights
are not terminated. 28 However, if the lesbian couple chooses to insem-
inate with the sperm from a known donor without the assistance of a
physician, the known donor retains parental rights.
Notwithstanding the legal predicament they may encounter,
many lesbian couples still choose to use known donors because of the
practical advantages. 29 As many married couples can attest, people
often desire to have a child bearing the genetic material of someone
the couple loves and respects. For a heterosexual couple, that desire is
usually fulfilled by being able to have a child that has the genetic ma-
terial of both partners.30 The desire is no less for a lesbian couple, and
find-sperm-donor.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) (recommending women contact "suit-
able" friends or acquaintances to use their sperm, while warning women that in some cases
the donor may retain parental rights).
26. Many couples inseminate at home using the "turkey baster" method (sperm is
deposited by the man, collected into a syringe-like apparatus, and inserted into the wo-
man). TimeCapsule, Ms. MAG., Dec. 1999/Jan. 2000, at 74.
27. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b).
28. Id. Many heterosexual couples who struggle to conceive use the process of in-vitro
fertilization. There are several other types of artificial reproduction that use the wife's egg
and the husband's sperm to conceive with the help of a physician. For a more detailed
explanation of assisted reproductive technologies, see the website of the University of Cali-
fornia, San Francisco Medical Center Women's Health, http://www.ucsfivf.org/ucsf-ivf.
htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2006).
29. See Berkeley Parents Network, Sperm Donation, Known Sperm Donor and Legal
Issues, http://parents.berkeley.edu/advice/parents/spermdonation.html#known (last vis-
ited Jan. 8, 2007) for a March 2004 discussion between women about the issues surround-
ing the use of known donors. "We have been given this wonderful gift by this amazing man
and it seems there are all these legal barriers to conceving [sic] this child. We know that we
will have to get a lawyer to assist us with the adoption, but why before to conception? [sic]"
Id.
30. Rainbow Flag Health Services, http://www.gayspermbank.com (last visited Oct. 6,
2006) (discussing a sperm bank for lesbians to find gay male donors who want to be known
to the couple and listing the benefits of using a known donor).
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that desire can be fulfilled by looking to a friend or family member for
donated sperm.
Other benefits of using a known donor to inseminate at home
are: the prohibitive financial and privacy costs of using a sperm bank
or physician,3 1 effectiveness, and efficiency.3 2 Another advantage of
using a known donor is the possibility of having the donor participate
in the child's life.33 However, while some couples want donor partici-
pation, they do not want the donor to have legal parental rights over
the resulting child.
D. The Act Fails to Address the Rights of a Couple in a Registered
Domestic Partnership Using a Known Donor
When drafting the Act, the California Legislature did not explic-
itly address the rights of registered domestic partners when they con-
ceive using a known donor without the aid of a physician. 34 Although
31. In Jhordan C., the court stated:
A requirement of physician involvement, as Mary argues, might offend a woman's
sense of privacy and reproductive autonomy, might result in burdensome costs to
some women, and might interfere with a woman's desire to conduct the proce-
dure in a comfortable environment such as her own home or to choose the donor
herself.
Jhordan C. v. Mary K, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 535 (Ct. App. 1986) (footnote omitted). The
court expanded on this in the following footnote, stating, "[o]ne article on the subject of
artificial insemination notes that many women prefer to choose a known donor because
this 'eliminates potential difficulties in gaining access to medical information, permits the
prospective mother to make the choice of donor herself, and allows the child access to
paternal roots.'" Id. at 535 n.7.
32. "Insemination with a known donor is cost effective." LGBT Health Channel-Al-
ternative Insemination, http://www.lgbthealthchannel.com/AI/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2006). See also Dr. Donnica, The First Name in Woman's Health, Tips for Enhancing Your
Fertility, http://www.drdonnica.com/toptips/00000739.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2006)
(suggesting that a satisfying sexual experience can help to facilitate conception).
33. See Rainbow Flag Health Services, supra note 30.
My two kids were conceived this way. The donor and his partner were old friends
of mine. But to insure everyone [sic] rights and responsibilities we took all the
legal precautions. We even did home insemination but paid them a nominal fee
each time. They have no rights or responsibilities. But they attended the births by
my invitation and have had their lives completely changed by having children in
their lives for the first time who they care about-very much to their surprise.
They are very involved in the children's lives and are considered a part of our
extended family.
Berkeley Parents Network, Sperm Donation, http://parents.berkeley.edu/advice/parents/
spermdonation.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
34. Nothing in the full text of the Act mentions sperm donors or artificial insemina-
tion. Specifically, the only section in the Act that discusses the legal relationships of domes-
tic partners and other persons neglects to mention sperm donors.
This act is not intended to repeal or adversely affect any other ways in which
relationships between adults may be recognized or given effect in California, or
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the Act appears to make the domestic partners legal parents, 35 the
statute does not terminate the rights of the known donor. The result is
a potential parental conflict between the non-birth mother and the
known donor. Allowing the known donor to have substantive parental
rights instead of the non-biological domestic partner disregards the
intentions behind the Act and withholds protections to same-sex
couples that married heterosexual couples enjoy. Allowing such an
inconsistency in parental rights to stand could be construed as a de-
nial of equal protection to domestic partners. 36
Arguably, it is unnecessary for the Act to specifically address the
known donor scenario because the language and legislative history of
the Act demonstrate that domestic partners are entitled to the same
presumptions of parentage afforded to married spouses.37 However,
absent clear language in the statute terminating the parental rights of
known donors upon donation to a couple in a registered domestic
partnership, it is unclear how the California courts will decide this
issue. Moreover, the California Legislature has not taken further steps
to address the ambiguities created by the Act. Therefore, the question
remains: Will the Act be interpreted by California courts to apply the
parental presumption created by the UPA to lesbian domestic part-
ners over the rights of known donors?38
the legal consequences of those relationships, including, among other things,
civil marriage, enforcement of palimony agreements, enforcement of powers of
attorney, appointment of conservators or guardians, and petitions for second par-
ent or limited consent adoption.
Assemb. B. 205, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(c) (Cal. 2003).
35. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
36. The constitutional debate of whether registered domestic partners are similarly
situated to married couples is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, the denial of
equal protection of California's family law to same-sex registered partners will not be ad-
dressed in this Comment.
37. The full text of the Act says that all state agencies will be required to "revis[e] all
public-use forms that refer to or use the terms spouse, husband, wife, father, mother, mar-
riage, or marital status, (and] that appropriate references to domestic partner, parent, or
domestic partnership are to be included." Assemb. B. 205, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 12(a) (14) (Cal. 2003). See Frederick Hertz, The New Realities of California's Domestic Partner-
ship Law, Discerning the Uncertain Impacts of A.B. 205, SAME SEX PARTNERSHIP L. REP., Apr.
2005, at 4 ("[A] step-parent adoption of a partner's child to establish both parents as legal
parents may not be necessary, because by law any child born or adopted by one of the
partners during a domestic partnership is presumed to be the legal child of both part-
ners."). This quote demonstrates that the perceived impact of the Act is to apply parentage
presumptions to registered domestic partners.
38. Grace Blumberg, California's Adoption of Strong Domestic Partnership Legislation for
Same-Sex Couples, UCLA SCH. PUB. AFF. CAL. POL'V OP-rIONS 130 (2006), available at http://
www.spa.ucla.edu/calpolicy/files06/blumbergrevrevll.pdf ("While [the Act] would appear
to provide equality of treatment [to registered domestic partners as spouses], the means of
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Indeed, there are many areas of California law, including the
UPA, where application to domestic partners may be confusing. The
sections of the UPA discussing parentage contain heavily gendered
terms. This terminology may create confusion in the courts as to how
to apply these laws to same-sex couples. 3 9 For example, California
Family Code section 7540 states: " [T] he child of a wife cohabiting with
her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to
be a child of the marriage. '40 Even if "domestic partner" is substituted
for "husband," the use of the terms "impotent or sterile" may prohibit
the courts applying this statute to a woman. Because two women can
never create a child without artificial insemination, the sterility of the
non-biological partner is irrelevant. Therefore, the courts may feel
that the use of the term "sterility," for the purposes of determining
parentage, is only relevant when applied to a heterosexual couple.
Of course the courts can simply ignore the gender-specific statu-
tory language when applying the parental presumption to domestic
partners, but the courts must still address a perceived legislative intent
in that statute for biology to overcome the presumption. 41 Although
the Act states, "[w]here necessary to implement the rights of regis-
tered domestic partners under this act, gender-specific terms referring
to spouses shall be construed to include domestic partners," 42 it is still
uncertain how the courts will interpret this provision when applying
the UPA.43 This problem is pressing given the fact that courts will not
easily ignore language in a statute in order to arrive at a decision that
reproduction used by same-sex couples are usually different than those of opposite-sex
couples .... The law regulating parenthood in opposite-sex couples, married or unmar-
ried, applies a series of presumptions based upon the likelihood that both partners are the
biological parents of a child. However, application of the presumptions of parenthood is
inapt when we know, as a biological fact, that a child does not have two biological mothers
or two biological fathers."). See Deborah Wald, The Wald Law Group, The Shape of Things to
Come, Pending and Soon-to-Be-Pending Parentage Litigation 3 (2006), http://waldlaw.net/
shapeof.things.pdf (discussing the uncertainty of how the Act will be applied when a
couple inseminates using a known donor without physician involvement).
39. CAL. F~am. CODE § 7540 (West 2004).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Blumberg, supra note 38, at 130. Additionally, in the registered domestic partner/
known donor scenario, the non-birth mother will not have a direct biological link to the
child. Although in other cases, the non-birth mother may have provided the egg for fertili-
zation and implantation in the birth mother, that situation avoids the conflict addressed in
this paper because the egg and sperm must have passed through a physician and therefore
the sperm donors rights are terminated under section 7613(a) or (b). CAL. F~AM. CODE
§§ 7613(a)-(b) (West 2004).
42. CAL. Fm. CODE § 297.5(1) (West 2004).
43. Blumberg, supra note 38, at 131-32.
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is otherwise supported. 44 If there is gender-specific terminology in a
statute, the court may very well hold that legislative intent is reflected
in the language that cannot be ignored. 45 However, this Comment
demonstrates why California courts need not ignore the gender-spe-
cific language of section 7540 to uphold the rights of domestic part-
ners over known donors.
As increasingly more women in registered domestic partnerships
begin families with the necessary help of sperm donors, issues of par-
entage become inevitable. 46 Although domestic partners may enter
into a contract with a known donor establishing that the donor
forgoes all parental rights, these contracts are not enforceable and are
only relevant to evidence intent. 47 Even if a donor demonstrates in-
tent not to parent the child at the time he signs a contract, there are
many conflicts that can arise when the child is born and the donor
may still assert paternity. 48 For non-biological mothers, the possibility
of having the parental rights to their children taken away from them
and given to the known donor is devastating.49 If the donor is awarded
parental rights in addition to both mothers, the couple may be forced
to parent with a third-party known donor against their wishes. 50 The
necessary resolution of this issue, based upon California Supreme
Court precedent and statutory law, is to grant parenthood to the non-
biological mother and terminate the rights of the known donor.
44. See In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994) (decided eleven years
before the Act went into effect). In Moschetta, the court would not apply provisions of the
UPA in a gender-neutral manner because gendered terms evidenced intent by legislature
to distinguish people on the basis of their reproductive roles. Id. at 896.
45. Id. at 896.
46. See LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Katha Pollitt,
The Strange Case of Baby M, NATION, May 23, 1987, at 667.
47. Deborah Wald, The Wald Law Group, California Surrogacy-A Gay Primer 1 (2006),
http://www.waldlaw.net/gay.surrogacy.pdf ("It is an established principle of family law
that you cannot either create or negate parentage via contract .... [A]dults cannot con-
tract away a child's right to a parental relationship; nor can adults create such a relation-
ship by contract alone. This is a fundamental concept of family law that California has
refused to abandon .... ").
48. See Pollitt, supra note 46, at 667. The most widely publicized case of a surrogacy
agreement gone awry is the infamous Baby M case involving surrogate mother, Mary Beth
Whitehead, and her fight to keep parental rights over a child carried for the Sterns, a
married, infertile couple. Id. See alsoJhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App.
1986). In Jhordan C., the mother alleged that she had an agreement with the known sperm
donor that he would not participate in the child's life. Id. at 532. The sperm donor
changed his mind after the baby was born. Id. at 532-33.
49. See LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d 151. A woman in a lesbian relationship was insemi-
nated using the sperm of a known donor. Id. at 157. After the donor initiated paternity
proceedings, a court vacated the adoption by the non-biological mother. Id. at 157-58.
50. See id. at 160-61.
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E. How California Can Protect the Rights of the Non-Biological
Mother
Our society consistently favors families that have two parents in a
legally cognizable relationship over families that have three parents.51
These preferences support the parental presumptions of the UPA. 52
In furtherance of the goal of protecting children and families, the
California Legislature enacted the Act in part to grant children of les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender ("LGBT") families the same pro-
tections afforded to children of heterosexual families. 53 Therefore,
the California Supreme Court must apply the UPA presumptions of
parentage to lesbian domestic partners, terminating the rights of the
known donor. Biological differences between men and women, and
between domestic partners and married couples, should not prevent
equal application of the parentage presumptions to domestic part-
ners. The California Supreme Court has already begun applying the
UPA in a gender-neutral manner to disputes between lesbian
mothers, and the court has no reason to depart from that approach
when lesbian domestic partners conceive using a known donor with-
out physician assistance. 54
H. Public Policy Supports the Two-Parent Family Model
California clearly prefers that a child is raised by two parents as
opposed to one. California lawmakers believe that the two-parent fam-
ily model provides the ideal structure for the healthy development
and optimal support of children. As the California Supreme Court
51. SeeJohnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72
Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998). In Buzzanca, a married couple bought an egg from an
anonymous donor, had it fertilized with the sperm of an anonymous donor, and implanted
it into a paid surrogate. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 282. When the couple divorced, the
trial court held that the child had no legal parents. Id. The Court of Appeal reversed and
declared the husband and wife legal parents. Id. See also Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530;
discussion, infra Section II.
52. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7540, 7613 (West 2004); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989); Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1998).
53. Assemb. B. 205, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (unenacted earlier version
dated Jan. 28, 2003).
Expanding the rights and responsibilities of registered domestic partners would
further California's interest in encouraging close and caring families, promoting
stable and lasting family relationships, and protecting family members from eco-
nomic and social consequences of abandonment, separation, the death of loved
ones, and other life crises; would protect these couples, the children they are
raising, third parties, and the state against numerous harms and costs ....
Id. § 1 (b) (3).
54. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
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stated in 2005 when determining that two women were both legal par-
ents of children they brought into the world using artificial
insemination:
By recognizing the value of determining paternity, [in making the
UPA law in California] the [California] Legislature implicitly rec-
ognized the value of having two parents, rather than one, as a
source of both emotional and financial support, especially when
the obligation to support the child would otherwise fall to the
public.
5 5
This preference is particularly evident when looking at cases be-
tween single mothers and known donors. In Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 5 6
Mary asked her friend Jhordan for his sperm so that she could bear a
child.57 Mary claimed that it was both parties's understanding that
Jhordan would play no role in the child's life.58 When Jhordan
changed his mind and brought a paternity action, the court agreed
that he deserved parental status despite Mary's opposition. 59 This is
the approach taken by most courts when a refusal to grant parentage
would leave a child with only one legal parent.60
The California Supreme Court has applied this two-parent policy
to same-sex parental disputes as well. In a trilogy of cases decided in
2005, Elisa B. v. Superior Court,6 1 K.M. v. E.G.,62 and Kristine H. v. Lisa
55. Id. at 669.
56. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
57. Id. at 532.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Ct. App. 2003). In Robert B., a
married couple contracted with an anonymous donor, through a fertility clinic, for an egg
to be fertilized with the husband's sperm for implantation in the wife. Id. at 786. Sepa-
rately, a single woman, Susan, used the same clinic to obtain a fertilized embryo from
anonymous donors for her own insemination. Id. The clinic erred and inseminated Susan
with the married couple's embryo. Id. The court, choosing to hold that a child has two
parents instead of one, declared that the husband, Robert, was the legal father of Susan's
child despite the fact that she had no relationship whatsoever to Robert. Id. at 786-87; see
also Elisa B., 117 P.3d 660. In Elisa B., one partner agreed to insemination of the other
partner using an anonymous donor. Id. at 663. The non-biological mother held the chil-
dren out as her own, but then later claimed she was not their parent. Id. The California
Supreme Court held that the woman was the other legal parent of the children. Id. at 670;
see also K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005). In K.M., one woman donated her egg to her
lesbian partner and agreed to relinquish her parental rights. Id. at 676. The California
Supreme Court held that the woman did not relinquish her parental rights in this scena-
rio. Id. at 678; see also Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 696 (Cal. 2005) (holding that
when the biological mother consented to ajudicial determination of parentage of the non-
biological mother, she was estopped from later claiming that the non-biological mother
was not a legal parent).
61. 117 P.3d 660.
62. 117 P.3d 673.
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R,63 the court held that both women in all three of the domestic part-
nerships were the legal parents of their partner's children.64 The
court held that only two parents had parental rights, irrespective of
the parties's intentions, when the alternative would have been to grant
parental rights to a sole parent.65
The California Supreme Court's affinity for the two-parent model
is also evident in situations where a child may have more than two
parents. For example, in Johnson v. Calvert,6 6 the court was confronted
with the unusual situation of having three parties with biological con-
nections to the child.67 Mark and Crispina, a married couple, each
provided eggs and sperm to be fertilized by a physician and implanted
in a surrogate mother, Anna.68 Although the three parties were bio-
logically connected to the child, the court said "[t] o recognize paren-
tal rights in a third party with whom the Calvert family has had little
contact since shortly after the child's birth would diminish Crispina's
role as a mother."69 Although it meant terminating Anna's parental
rights, the court chose to adhere to the traditional two-parent family
model rather than grant parental rights to three parties. 70 Also, in the
case In re Kiana A., 71 the court determined that Kiana's father could
have been one of two men. 72 The court could have allowed Kiana to
have three parents: her mother and the two presumed fathers. 73 In-
stead, the court chose to grant parental rights to only one of the two
putative fathers, giving Kiana two parents instead of three.74
The decisions of the California Supreme Court reflect a general
perception in our society that the two-parent model is in the best in-
63. 117 P.3d 690.
64. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670; K.M., 117 P.3d at 675; Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 696.
65. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670; K.M., 117 P.3d at 675; Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 696.
66. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
67. Id. at 782. The court said that under the UPA, both the gestational mother and
the genetic mother could be the "natural" mothers. Id.
68. Id. at 778.
69. Id. at 782.
70. Id. Therefore Anna was a legal mother of the child. However, Crispina was also a
legal mother of the child having provided the egg that became the child. Id. The California
Supreme Court decided to choose between the three legal parents and declare Mark and
Crispina to be the only legal parents. Id. See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 2004)
(establishing maternity in the mother when she gives birth to the child).
71. 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669 (Ct. App. 2001).
72. 1d. at 673-74.
73. 1d. at 674.
74. 1d. at 679-80.
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terests of the child. 75 In the ideal scenario, the two parents are in a
legally recognized partnership. The United States Supreme Court pos-
tulated this view in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,76 a case where the mother's
lover wanted parental rights to a child born during her marriage to
another man.7 7 Quoting from the California Court of Appeal, Justice
Scalia wrote: ""'[It is] overriding social policy, that given a certain re-
lationship between the husband and wife.., the integrity of the fam-
ily unit should not be impugned."' "78 Scalia further elaborated on
how courts have gone to great lengths to protect the traditional model
of a married couple raising a child without interference from third
parties: "The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society,
which we have referred to as the 'unitary family,' is typified, of course,
by the marital family . . .,79
In Michael H., the United States Supreme Court upheld centuries
of precedent,8 0 acknowledging the societal importance of the conclu-
sive presumption of parentage favoring the husband over the wife's
lover:
The primary policy rationale underlying the common law's severe
restrictions on rebuttal of the presumption appears to have been
an aversion to declaring children illegitimate .... A secondary
policy concern was the interest in promoting the "peace and tran-
quility of States and families,".. . a goal that is obviously impaired
by facilitating suits against husband and wife asserting that their
children are [not products of their marriage].81
Justice Scalia went on to note that the Court was not aware of a
single case in which a state had awarded "substantive parental rights to
the [non-husband] natural father of a child conceived within, and
born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the
child."8 2 It is evident that courts favor the two-parent marriage model
in the interests of family harmony and stability.
This interest is no less important when applied to two-parent
same-sex domestic partners raising children. As Justice Scalia ex-
75. SeeElisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673
(Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005); Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 785 (Ct. App. 2003).
76. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (see discussion supra Section I(A)).
77. Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 at 113-14.
78. Id. at 119-20.
79. Id. at 123 n.3.
80. Id. at 124-25 (Scalia discusses the history behind the "presumption of legitimacy,"
citing material dating back to 1569).
81. Id. at 125.
82. Id. at 127.
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plained,83 the unitary family has been afforded centuries of respect in
our society8 4 because the stability of the union provides a belter envi-
ronment in which to raise children.85 Therefore, it is clearly prefer-
able for children to be raised in a stable and supportive two-parent
same-sex domestic partnership than to be raised amid an acrimonious
parental dispute where one mother is denied parental rights in favor
of the known donor.8
6
IH. Presumed Parentage and the UPA in California
In order to protect and further the two-parent family model,
common law doctrine and state statutory law create presumptions of
parentage that can only be rebutted in limited situations. Most of the
legally created presumptions pertain to fatherhood on the assumption
that it is usually unnecessary to create a presumption determining ma-
ternity. However, as discussed herein, there have been occasions when
a court has applied the presumptions to mothers.
A. The Presumption of Fatherhood
In Michael H., the United States Supreme Court asserted that it
was not unconstitutional to deny parentage to a man who fathers a
child, if that child is born to a woman in a legal marriage. 87 In fact,
the biological father cannot challenge the husband's presumption of
paternity even if the biological father has an ongoing relationship
with the child and the child calls him "Daddy."88 Although in disa-
greement about what role the biological father's relationship with the
child played in the disposition of Michael H., seven of the nine Califor-
nia Supreme CourtJustices agreed in Dawn D. v. Superior Court89 that a
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 125.
86. Although Justice Scalia is widely considered a foe of gay and lesbian civil rights, his
rationale that a two-parent family is the best environment to raise a child is applicable in
this situation because California recognizes that gay and lesbian people can create healthy
and stable families. See Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Scalia's Talk to Antigay Group
Spurs Ethics Questions, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/
articles/2004/03/08/scalias talk to antigay-groupspursethics.questions/. Therefore,
Justice Scalia's reasoning that healthy and stable two-parent families are in the best inter-
ests of children supports California's protection of gay and lesbian families.
87. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 135-36.
88. Id. at 143-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. 952 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1998).
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biological link alone does not create due process rights in the biologi-
cal father to overcome the husband's presumed fatherhood. 90
In Dawn D., the California Supreme Court dealt with the issue of
presumed fatherhood. 9' Dawn was married to Frank but separated
from him and began living with Jerry.92 Dawn became pregnant by
Jerry and returned to live with her husband Frank.93 Jerry petitioned
the court for a determination of parentage and visitation with the
child.94 The California Supreme Court, relying heavily on Michael H.,
held that Jerry did not have a constitutionally protected interest in
establishing a relationship with his biological child when that child
was born to a woman married to another man.95 In her concurrence,
Justice Kennard laid out the long tradition of the marital presumption
and went so far as to say that if Jerry had wanted a relationship with a
child, he should have married and had a child of his own.9 6
The presumption of fatherhood and its application demonstrates
that the stability and unity of the family is ultimately more important
than biological certainty. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court
appears inclined to use the parental presumptions to discourage ex-
tramarital relationships. Lesbian women, however, are not allowed to
marry in the United States or the State of California. 97 Therefore, two
women solemnize their relationship by registering as domestic part-
ners in the state of California.98 However, in order to conceive, wo-
men in domestic partnerships must go outside of their relationship in
order to get the necessary biological material. In the interest of
preventing discrimination and equally applying the laws of California,
domestic partners must not be penalized for their inability to conceive
solely within their relationship; domestic partners need the same pre-
sumption of parentage afforded to husbands in heterosexual marital
relationships. The two-parent preference in Dawn D. must apply with
equal force to lesbian domestic partners and therefore preserve the
parental rights of the non-biological domestic partner over the known
donor.
90. Id. at 1144 (discussing the fact that even the dissent in Michael H. rejected the
possibility that a biological connection alone is sufficient to create a parental relationship
with the child).
91. Id. at 1139-40.
92. Id. at 1140.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1145.
96. Id. at 1148 (Kennard, J., concurring).
97. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2001); CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004).
98. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004).
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B. California's UPA
1. Family Code Sections 7540 and 7611(a)
The statutory law of California reflects the deeply held belief that
"'a mere biological connection is insufficient to establish a liberty in-
terest on the part of an unwed father. . . .'99 California Family Code
section 7540 creates a conclusive presumption that the husband and
wife are the legal parents of a child born to them during their mar-
riage if the husband is not impotent or sterile.10 0 Under Family Code
section 7611 (a), a husband is presumed to be the father of a child if
the child was born while the husband and wife were married, or
within three-hundred days after the termination of the marriage.' 0 '
Sections 7541 and 7630 clarify who may challenge the presumption of
paternity created by sections 7540 and 7611(a). 102 Only a child, the
child's natural mother, or a man who is already presumed to be the
child's father may bring an action to challenge paternity, which is es-
tablished under section 7611(a). 10 3 Therefore, if a husband and wife
are married and have a child, the husband may bring an action to
challenge his presumed paternity. For example, the presumed father
may bring such an action upon his divorce from his wife because the
husband does not want to pay child support due to his belief that he is
not the natural father of the child.
2. Family Code Section 7611(d)
Another provision of the UPA, California Family Code section
7611 (d), states that a man who openly holds a child out as his own is a
presumed father in California. In Nicholas H.,' 0 4 Thomas was not
Nicholas's biological father and had admitted to that fact during de-
pendency proceedings. 10 5 However, he received Nicholas into his
home and held him out as his natural child.'0 6 He also provided fi-
nancial support for Nicholas for most of the child's life.' 0 7 The court,
99. Dawn D., 952 P.2d at 1144 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 143 n.2
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
100. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2004).
101. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
102. CAL. FAm. CODE § 7541 (West 2004); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(a) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2006).
103. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541; CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(a).
104. 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002).
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therefore, held Thomas to be Nicholas's presumed father. 10 8 In an-
other case, a California Court of Appeal applied section 7611 (d) to a
mother.10 9 In Karen C., a woman gave birth to an unwanted child and
immediately gave her to another woman, Leticia, whose name went on
Karen's birth certificate." 0 Based on the fact that Leticia was the only
mother Karen had ever known, and only a social worker was aware
that Leticia was not Karen's biological mother, the court held that,
under section 7611 (d), Leticia established maternity.II'
Such case law demonstrates the strong precedent in California to
acknowledge presumptions of parentage absent a biological link with
the child. Clearly, in the context of domestic partners, this assumption
becomes critical as one mother will necessarily lack a biological con-
nection to the child. However, as demonstrated, it is not the biological
connection to the child, but rather the behavior of that parent with
the child and the parent's relationship with that child's mother that
creates a presumption of parentage. Therefore, the fact that the
known donor is biologically related to a child is not enough to defeat
the presumption of parentage in the non-biological mother.
IV. The Presumptions of the UPA Must Apply Equally to
Domestic Partners as to Married Couples
A. The Two-Parent Family Model Rationale Applies to Same-Sex
Families
The rationale for the parentage presumptions' 12-to protect the
two-parent family model-is no less important in registered domestic
partnerships than in heterosexual marriages. The potential destruc-
tion to the harmony of a partnership in addition to the traumatic
repercussions for the child are equally as plausible when a known do-
nor tries to assert parentage over the objections of the birth mother
and her partner.
The only ostensible difference from an illicit lover asserting par-
entage over a child born into a marriage is that both domestic part-
ners assent to the role of the known donor in the conception of their
child. This difference is of limited significance, however. Presumably,
108. Id. at 934.
109. In re Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 678 (Ct. App. 2002).
110. Id. at 678. The court did, however, express reluctance in granting maternity to
someone who suffered from alcoholism and depression and attempted suicide several
times. Id. at 678 n.1.
111. Id. at 682.
112. See discussion supra Part II.
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the fact that both domestic partners know of the role of the sperm
donor in conceiving their child prevents the kind of traumatic discov-
ery faced in a marriage when the husband discovers that his wife has
been having sex with another man. Therefore, the need to protect the
husband's presumed paternity might seem more important to the sta-
bility of the marital union than in the domestic partnership.
However, by the time the presumption of paternity is needed to
protect the husband's right to his child, this rationale falls apart.
Clearly, if someone has tried to assert paternity over the husband's
child, the traumatic event in the marriage has already occurred. How-
ever, taking the child away from the husband and forcing the wife to
co-parent with the lover may further deteriorate whatever is left of the
marriage.
The same is true in a domestic partnership. The stress, emotion-
ally and financially, of a long and drawn-out legal battle on the part-
ners and their child can be enormous. And, of ultimate significance, a
grant of paternity to the known donor will destroy the unitary two-
parent family that our legal institutions have gone to such great
lengths to protect. To reiterate Justice Scalia's point in Michael H., so-
ciety does not favor a natural father over a marital family that em-
braces the child as its own. 113 Furthermore, to apply the same
rationale used by the California Supreme Court when it terminated
the rights of the surrogate in order to protect the two-parent unitary
family in Johnson v. Calvert,114 recognizing the sperm donor as having
parental rights would diminish the non-biological mother's role as a
parent. 1 5 Extending the traditional family model to three parents, or
limiting it to one, is something the court was unwilling to do in the
interest of family stability.11 6 This rationale has no less force when ap-
plied to same-sex families using a known donor instead of a
surrogate.' 17
B. The Act Provides Legal Protection to the Same-Sex Two-Parent
Family Model
In recognition of the fact that same-sex couples were registering
as domestic partners and creating families mirroring the marital fam-
113. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989).
114. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
115. Id. at 781.
116. Id.
117. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673
(Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005).
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ily, the legislature enacted the Act to offer the same protection to
these relationships as provided to, and needed in, heterosexual mar-
riages.1 18 The language of the Act specifically provides for the pre-
sumed parentage statutes to apply to domestic partners."t 9 The Act
forbids the discriminatory application of laws based on the biological
differences between a husband in a marriage and partner in a regis-
tered domestic partnership. 20
The need for these protections is essential in order for a non-
biological mother to retain rights to her children when her relation-
ship with the biological mother ends. For example, in K.M. v. E.G. and
Kristine H., the biological mother tried to assert that her domestic
partner had no rights to the children they conceived and raised to-
gether since birth.1 21 The biological mother needs this protection as
well to ensure that the non-biological mother will not shirk her paren-
tal responsibilities when it suits her. In Elisa B., Emily and her partner,
Elisa, simultaneously got pregnant using artificial insemination. 122
Emily had twins, one of which was severely disabled.1 23 When the rela-
tionship deteriorated, Elisa tried to claim that she was not the mother
of the twins precluding any obligation to pay for their care. 124 This left
Emily in a precarious financial situation.125
The need for two people who bring a child into the world to-
gether to have their parentage legally protected is paramount for an-
other reason as well. If the biological mother dies and her domestic
partner is unable to get custody of the child because the partner is not
118. The intent behind the Act is clearly stated by the California Legislature:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that despite longstanding social and
economic discrimination, many lesbian, gay, and bisexual Californians have
formed lasting, committed, and caring relationships with persons of the same sex.
These couples share lives together, participate in their communities together,
and many raise children and care for other dependent family members together.
Many of these couples have sought to protect each other and their family mem-
bers by registering as domestic partners with the State of California and, as a
result, have received certain basic legal rights. Expanding the rights and creating
responsibilities of registered domestic partners would further California's inter-
ests in promoting family relationships and protecting family members during life
crises, and would reduce discrimination on the bases of sex and sexual orienta-
tion in a manner consistent with the requirements of the California Constitution.
Assemb. B. 205, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(b) (Cal. 2003).
119. CAL. FAmr. CoDE § 297.5(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
120. Id. § 297.5(h).
121. K.M., 117 P.3d at 675-76; Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 692.
122. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P. 3d 660, 663 (Cal. 2005).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 663-64.
125. Id. at 663.
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the child's legal parent, the child may be placed into the custody of a
homophobic or hostile family who will prevent the non-biological par-
ent from having a relationship with her child. 126
The child, too, deserves several rights from a legal relationship
with his or her non-biological parent, such as: rights to financial bene-
fits, inheritance under intestacy laws, wrongful death and loss of con-
sortium damages, Social Security benefits, child support, and health
insurance benefits. 127 For these important reasons, the rights of the
non-biological mother must be protected even if that means terminat-
ing the rights of the known donor.
C. The Presumptions of Parentage Must Apply to Same-Sex
Families
1. Application of Section 7540 and Section 7611(a)
Both Family Code sections 7540 and 7611(a), which state that a
child born into a marriage is presumed to be a child of that marriage,
envision situations where a child is born to a woman who is legally
married to a man.128 Section 7540 creates a conclusive presumption
that applies when the mother has been cohabitating with her husband
and a child is born into their marriage.i29 Section 7611(a) creates a
rebuttable presumption that applies when a child is born into a mar-
riage during which at some point the husband and wife do not live
together. 3 0
a. The Known Donor Does Not Have Standing Under Section
7540 or Section 7611(a) to Challenge Paternity
In Dawn D., the California Supreme Court not only recognized
that the non-husband biological father does not have a constitution-
ally protected interest in asserting paternity, it also held that he did
not have a statutorily protected interest under Family Code section
7611 because he was not "cohabitating" with the mother at the time of
126. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, ADOPTION By LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEX-
UAL PARENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW, http://www.nclrights.org/publications/
adptn0204.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) for a discussion of cases where the non-biologi-
cal parent was forced to litigate against the biological mother's family for custody of the
children after the death of the biological mother.
127. See id. for a discussion on the rights afforded to non-biological parents upon
adoption.
128. CAL. FAm. CODE § 7540 (West 2004); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2006).
129. CA.. FAM. CODE § 7540.
130. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a).
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conception.' 3' The court also prevented the biological father from as-
serting paternity because he was not one of the three parties who had
standing to challenge paternity-the child, the mother, or the pre-
sumed father.1 32 The presumed father in Dawn D. was the husband of
the mother, not her lover. 133
The same interpretation of sections 7540 and 7611 (a) must apply
when a child is born into a domestic partnership using the sperm of a
known donor. Whether the presumption is conclusive (section 7540)
or rebuttable (section 7611(a)), the donor is not a party that has
standing to challenge parentage. In the context of domestic partners,
the known donor is neither the child, the mother, nor the presumed
father (since the donor is not married to the mother at the time the
child is born). 3 4 Therefore, under the provisions of the UPA, the do-
nor lacks standing to challenge paternity in the same way the wife's
lover lacked standing in Dawn D.13 5
Furthermore, although section 7541 (a) states that "if the court
finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evi-
dence based on blood tests... are that the husband is not the father
of the child, the question of paternity of the husband shall be resolved
accordingly," the only person that may order blood tests under section
7540 are the husband, child, or a man who qualifies as a presumed
father under section 7611.136 Because section 7611 only allows for pre-
sumed paternity if the man is either married to the child's mother or
actively participates in the child's life and holds him or her out as his
own, a sperm donor will never qualify as a presumed father under
section 7611 before the child is born.137 Therefore, a sperm donor
will not have standing to order blood tests under section 7541.
If the donor lacks standing to challenge the presumptions cre-
ated by the UPA (and affirmed in the Act), then it is irrelevant
whether the sperm donor statute creates parental rights in the known
donor because he will never have standing to challenge the parentage
of the domestic partner. The sperm donor statute does not give the
donor an affirmative right to establish paternity.138 In fact, the only
time someone other than the biological mother, putative father, or
131. Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Cal. 1998).
132. Id. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (West 2004).
133. Dawn D., 952 P.2d at 1140.
134. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a).
135. See Dawn D., 952 P.2d at 1142.
136. CAL. FAm. CODE § 7541; CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2004).
137. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611.
138. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2004).
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child can challenge parentage is when a presumption of parentage is
established by the parent's affirmative action in holding the child out
as one's own, as set forth in Family Code section 7611(d). Since this
Comment discusses why full parental rights should exist in the non-
biological parent before the child is born, this grant of standing to the
known donor should not be available to the known donor to chal-
lenge paternity in this instance.
Since the enactment of the Act, the only parties that have stand-
ing to challenge parentage are the biological mother, the child, and
the domestic partner.139 The California Supreme Court has already
prevented domestic partners from disavowing their parental responsi-
bilities or trying to terminate their former partners's rights when the
domestic partners take affirmative steps together to bring a child into
the world using artificial insemination. 140 Although to date no child
has brought a parentage action to terminate the rights of her non-
biological mother in favor of the sperm donor, it is fair to assume that
the courts would not allow the child to succeed on such grounds. Pre-
sumably, the reason a child can bring a paternity action is to enable
him or her to discover the identity of her biological father. Because it
is already known that the non-biological mother is not biologically re-
lated to the child, allowing the child to bring an action to terminate
her non-biological mother's rights is exactly the sort of bootstrapping
argument previously rejected by the courts. 14 1
Whatever the rationale for allowing a child to bring a paternity
action, just as in Elisa B., K.M., and Kristine H.,' 42 the courts will not
allow a malicious attempt by a domestic partner to deny her partner
rights to a child that the partner helped conceive through artificial
insemination. 143 Therefore, when two registered domestic partners
bring a child into the world using artificial insemination, the non-bio-
logical mother will be a presumed parent, and a paternity action
under 7611 or 7540 cannot defeat her parentage. This is because the
139. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541.
140. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005) (disallowing a non-
biological mother from abrogating her parental responsibilities by claiming that she was
not biologically related to the child, and hence, not a parent); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673
(Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 692 (Cal. 2005) (disallowing the biological
mother to deny her partner's parental rights to their child on the basis that a same-sex
partner cannot be a legal parent because both parents consented to the artificial insemina-
tion of one partner and that the biological mother's argument was essentially
bootstrapping).
141. See discussion of cases, supra note 140.
142. See discussion of cases, supra note 60.
143. See Elisa B., 117 P.3d 670; K.M., 117 P.3d 678; Kristine H., 117 P.3d 696.
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known donor does not have standing to bring the action, and the bio-
logical mother and child cannot defeat the parentage of the non-bio-
logical mother. Therefore, the only parties that have standing to
challenge parentage-the biological mother, the child and the do-
mestic partner-under the statute would be precluded from doing so.
b. The Gendered Terms of Section 7540, "Impotent or Sterile,"
Cannot Be Used to Deny Parentage to the Non-
Biological Mother
The fact that Family Code section 7540 allows a parental chal-
lenge if the husband is impotent or sterile does not affect the rights of
the non-biological mother for two reasons. First, the Act explicitly for-
bids the application of laws containing gendered terms to prevent do-
mestic partners from protection under those laws.144 If a domestic
partner could never establish parentage under section 7540 because
she could not have biologically produced the child (i.e., she is impo-
tent or sterile for the purposes of the statute), then she is being de-
nied legal protection based on the gendered terms of a statute.
Because such a consequence is illegal in California, the language "im-
potent or sterile" cannot bar a domestic partner from establishing par-
entage under section 7540.
Second, the "impotent or sterile" language of section 7540 can-
not prevent a domestic partner from establishing parentage because
the only parties who could raise a parental challenge and, therefore,
assert that the domestic partner is impotent or sterile, have no practi-
cal basis for doing so. This would require the biological mother to go
to court and essentially claim that her domestic partner could not be
the other parent of her child because the partner is impotent or ster-
ile. Although domestic partners have tried to deny their former part-
ner' s parental rights, the California Supreme Court has rejected those
attempts when both partners actively bring a child into the world to-
gether using artificial insemination. 145 Even though the child also has
legal standing to challenge parentage under section 7540, it is incon-
ceivable that the court would reject the mother's ability to challenge
the parentage of her partner yet allow the child to do so. If the child
were able to challenge paternity, it would have to be on some ground
other than the fact that the partner is "impotent or sterile."
144. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
145. See Elisa B., 117 P.3d 670; K.M., 117 P.3d 678; Kristine H., 117 P.3d 696.
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2. Biology Will Not Trump the Presumption of Parentage in the
Case of the Known Donor
Even if the donor did have standing to challenge the presump-
tion of parentage, he would be unlikely to prevail if he has nothing
more than a biological connection with the child. As previously noted,
both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme
Court have rejected the notion that biology alone creates substantive
legal parental rights. 146
Not only is biology inconclusive in parental presumptions, but
once a presumption is created, the court has discretion whether to
allow a paternity test to override the presumptions in the best interest
of the child. 147 In the case In re Kiana A., two men had competing
claims of paternity to Kiana. 148 The court held, however, that a pater-
nity test establishing one of the men as the biological father would not
have resolved the competing claims. 149 Both men had established
themselves as fathers under the presumptions of paternity.150 One
man, Mario A., had married Kiana's mother and his name was on Ki-
ana's birth certificate. 15 1 The court recognized him as a presumptive
father under section 7611 (c) (1), which allows a man to be a presump-
tive father in exactly that situation. 152 The other man, Kevin W., had
received Kiana into his home and held her out as his child. 153 Kevin
W. was therefore entitled to a presumption of paternity under
7611 (d).154 The court looked to the best interest of the child to deter-
mine which "father" should get parental rights.155 Determining that
the child had a strong and developed relationship with Kevin W., the
court held that he was Kiana's legal father.' 56 This case suggests that
genetic proof of parentage will not necessarily trump a parental pre-
sumption, leaving ample room for grants of parentage to non-biologi-
cal parents over biological parents. The California Supreme Court
affirmed this approach in a more recent case, In re Jesusa V, 1 57 by
146. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126 (1989); Dawn D. v. Superior Court,
952 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Cal. 1998).
147. In re Kiana A., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 678 (Ct. App. 2001).
148. Id. at 673-74.
149. Id. at 678.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 676.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 677.
155. Id. at 679-80.
156. Id.
157. 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
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awarding substantive parental rights to the mother's husband over the
biological father. 5 8
The fact that biology does not conclusively defeat presumptions
of parentage means that in spite of a lack of genetic link between the
domestic partner and the child, the non-biological domestic partner
can nonetheless be the legal parent of the child. As demonstrated in
Kiana A. and Jesusa V, it is the best interests of the child that should
ultimately govern grants of parentage, second to the demonstration of
parentage. The California Legislature enacted the Act, and in particu-
lar subsection (d), to protect the best interests of children born into
domestic partnerships. Upholding the legislative intent of the Act and
the precedent set by California case law means keeping intact families
together rather than granting parental rights simply on biological fac-
tors alone.
3. The California Supreme Court Has Already Applied a
Presumption of Parentage to Same-Sex Parental
Disputes
The California Supreme Court has already applied the UPA pre-
sumptions of parentage to same-sex couples in a different factual con-
text. In Elisa B., two women in a committed relationship decided to
each get pregnant using sperm from the same anonymous donor.159
Elisa gave birth to one child and her partner, Emily, gave birth to
twins, one of whom was significantly disabled. 60 The relationship de-
teriorated and Elisa tried to claim that she was not financially respon-
sible for Emily's twins.1 6 1 The court held that Elisa was a presumed
parent under California Family Code section 7611 (d) and the law cre-
ated in Nicholas H.:
[S]he received the children into her home and openly held them
out as her natural children,.., this is not an appropriate action in
which to rebut the presumption that Elisa is the twins' parent with
proof that she is not the children's biological mother because she
actively participated in causing the children to be conceived with
the understanding that she would raise the children as her own
together with the birth mother, she voluntarily accepted the fights
and obligations of parenthood after the children were born, and
there are no competing claims to her being the children's second
parent. ' 6 2
158. Id. at 13-14.
159. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 663-64 (Cal. 2005).
160. Id. at 663.
161. Id. at 663-64.
162. Id. at 670.
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Although Elisa B. is factually distinct from the situation envi-
sioned by this Comment, Elisa was trying to avoid parental responsibil-
ities and leave her child with only one parent. The holding
demonstrates that the California Supreme Court will apply the pre-
sumption of parental provisions of the UPA to same-sex couples, at
least to uphold the two-parent family model. In Elisa B., however, the
court was not terminating anyone's statutory parental rights.163 As dis-
cussed earlier, the California Supreme Court prefers that children are
raised in a two-parent family. Therefore, when determining which of
three parties should have full parental rights, the biological mother,
her partner, or the known donor, the court should likewise have no
trouble applying sections 7540 and 7611(a) to conclude that the do-
mestic partners are the legal parents.
V. Conclusion
To prevent discriminatory application of the laws and uphold the
protections afforded to domestic partnerships granted by the Act, the
California Supreme Court must say to the known donor-as Justice
Kennard said to Jerry in Dawn D.-if you donate sperm, you take the
risk that the child will be raised within that domestic partnership and
that you will be excluded from participation in the child's life. 164 Ter-
minating the rights of the known donor in favor of the non-biological
mother might have painful consequences. For example, it is not diffi-
cult to envision a situation where the couple and donor agree prior to
the birth of the child that the donor will play an active role in the life
of the child, and the couple later takes unilateral steps to dissolve that
relationship. However, it is equally unfortunate to terminate the rights
of the non-biological partners who participated in the planning and
conception of her child simply because she may not enter into a legal
marriage. It would be inimical to uphold cases like Michael H. and
Dawn D., where the male lover of a married woman is denied legal
rights to the child he fathered because the woman he impregnated is
legally married to another man, while allowing a known donor, who
donated sperm to two women in a registered domestic partnership, to
have parental rights over the non-biological partner. Such action
would be absurd and undermine the clear legislative intent to provide
protections for gay and lesbian families. Therefore, California must
163. Id.
164. Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139, 1148 (Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J.,
concurring).
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protect the non-biological mother's right to be a legal parent as the
legislature intended with the Act.165
This means finding that a child born into a registered domestic
partnership is the child of that union and rejecting the standing of a
known donor who challenges such parentage. As the California Su-
preme Court has been willing to apply parental presumptions to do-
mestic partners for the purpose of upholding the two-parent family
model, the court must apply the presumption of parentage to domes-
tic partners over the known donor. It is critical that the court is
steadfast in the application of these provisions in order to affect the
intent of the Act and protect the children of gay and lesbian families
just as they do the children of heterosexual families.
165. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
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